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INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1982 MERGER
GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 1982 the United States Department of Justice (De-
partment) issued a new set of guidelines' designed to outline the
enforcement policy of the Department concerning acquisitions and
mergers (hereinafter referred to collectively as mergers)2 under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act 3 or section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 The
1982 Guidelines replaces prior guidelines issued in 19685 and is
designed to reflect changes in "economic thinking and judicial atti-
tudes" that have rendered the 1968 Guidelines obsolete in impor-
tant areas,6 including relevant market definition.7
While the primary impact of the new guidelines will be felt do-
mestically, their international effect is likely to be substantial,
given the historically aggressive extraterritorial application of the
federal antitrust laws,8 the annually large number of mergers in-
' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 9-54 (June 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 GUIDELINES].
2 Id. at 11.
3 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1973). Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 was designed to deal with
problems of economic concentration which the nation's first antitrust law, the Sherman Act
of 1890, had failed to combat effectively. Mergers subject to section 7 are prohibited if their
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
- 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1973). The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in the wake of wide-
spread public concern over economic abuses perpetrated by trusts and other business com-
binations in the late 19th century. Mergers subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act are
prohibited if they constitute a "contract, combination .... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade." Id.
a UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 2
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 74510, at 6881-21 to 6889 (Aug. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1968
GUIDELINES].
I William French Smith, U.S. Attorney General, Introduction to Merger Guidelines, June
14, 1982, reprinted in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 5, 6 (June 16, 1982). French views
the 1982 Guidelines as "an evolutionary change- not a revolutionary change." Id.
See Special Analysis, 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST REP.
(MB) 12, 14 (July 1982) [hereinafter cited as Special Analysis].
6 This policy of the United States has been much criticized on an international basis. See,
e.g., British Minister Criticizes Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by U.S., 43 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1088, at 861-62 (Nov. 4, 1982). For a discussion of
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volving United States and foreign firms," and the expressed inten-
tion of the current administration to have international competi-
tion play a more prominent role in the analysis of mergers.10
Significantly, one of the first Department challenges under the
1982 Guidelines involved the acquisition of a British firm by a
United States corporation," which reflects the scrutiny to which
both United States and foreign viewpoints on this topic, see generally PERSPECTIVEs ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
See also Mirabito & Friedler, The Commission on the International Application of the
U.S. Antitrust Laws: Pulling in the Reins?, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 3-6 (1982) (analy-
sis of proposed legislation).
9
MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY






U.S. acquiring U.S. 444 472 506 542
Non-U.S. acquiring U.S. 57 74 65 70
U.S. acquiring Non-U.S. 20 17 21 25
1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
1982 1982 1982 1982
U.S. acquiring U.S. 526 493 439 502
Non-U.S. acquiring U.S. 65 51 67 40
U.S. acquiring Non-U.S. 43 35 33 27
(Includes only transactions valued at $1 million or more in cash, market value of capital
stock exchanged or debt securities.)
Adapted from For the Record, 17 MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONs 56 (Spring 1982); For the
Record, 17 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 60 (Fall 1982); For the Record, 17 MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 72 (Winter 1983); 18 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 65 (Spring 1983).
o See, e.g., Baxter Seeks Greater Consideration of International Competition in Merger
Cases, [Jul.-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1030, at A-17 to A-19 (Sept. 3,
1981) (head of Department's Antitrust Division emphasizing role of international competi-
tion in formulating new guidelines); Interview with William F. Baxter, 51 ANTITRUST L.J.
23, 27 (1982) (explaining role of international competition in market definition).
" United States v. American Brands, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 5020 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 2, 1982).
See Justice Attacks American Brands' Acquisition of British Company, 43 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1076, at 291 (Aug. 5, 1982). American Brands, Inc. is a holding
company involved in the manufacture and sale of home and office staplers through its whol-
ly-owned subsidiaries, Swingline Inc. and Ace Fastener Co. The Department's complaint
alleged that American Brands' acquisition of Ofrex Group, Ltd., a British office supply man-
ufacturer and distributor that makes sales in the United States, violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act because the acquisition may tend to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly in the production and sale of home and office staplers. In 1980 American Brands,
the dominant producer of home and office staplers in the United States market, accounted
for approximately 67% of the market while Ofrex, the fourth largest seller, accounted for
6% of the market. In challenging this merger, the Department specifically used the 1982
Guidelines in defining the relevant market and analyzing market concentration under the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. For discussion of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, see infra
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international mergers will be subject under the new guidelines.
This Note will trace briefly the development of the 1982 Guide-
lines and analyze their anticipated impact on international corpo-
rate operations. Emphasis will be placed on evaluating the effect of
the 1982 Guidelines on the crucial issues of geographic and prod-
uct market definition and of the degree to which these guidelines
achieve the Department's goal of reducing uncertainty in the field
of international mergers."'
II. HISTORY
The first serious efforts to set forth comprehensive merger guide-
lines began in 1955."' Severe criticism of the impracticality of this
early attempt to predict the effect of mergers through extensive
economic analysis14 was followed by judicial adoption of market
share analysis as the primary consideration in merger analysis."5
Emphasis on market structure created a need for additional guid-
ance for lawyers and businessmen contemplating mergers." Re-
sponding to this need, the Department issued merger guidelines on
May 30, 1968.'1
notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Subsequently, American Brands agreed to divest its
ownership and control over its wholly owned subsidiary Ace Fastener Co., a division of Sw-
ingline, Inc., to settle the Department's challenge. See American Brands Agrees to Divest
Stapler Producer to Settle §7 Suit, 43 ATrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1085, at
748 (Oct. 14, 1982).
" See Smith, supra note 6 (outlining goals of the new guidelines).
'3 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (1955). The Report lists over 50 factors to be considered in the analysis of
mergers. Id. at 123, 125-27. For a more detailed discussion of the Report, see Edwards, Joffe,
Kolasky, McGowan, Mendez-Penate, Ordover, Proger, Solomon, & Toepke, Proposed Revi-
sions of the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1548 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Edwards]. See also Symposium on the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 7 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST PROC.
12 (1955-56).
" See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. Rzv. 226 (1960). Professor Bok criticized the "dizzying list of factors" used in the
Report and its failure to preserve "a workable system of judicial administration and enforce-
ment." Id. at 256-57. Instead Bok suggested a more practical approach based on market
shares. Id. at 309.
" See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-67 (1963);
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-52 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-74 (1966).
"S See E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 213 (1973) (discussion of the need
for guidance in this area).
" For further discussion of the events surrounding the issuance of the 1968 Guidelines
and the initial reaction to them, see The Merger Guidelines, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 872, 874
(1968).
19831 799
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13:797
The 1968 Guidelines relied extensively on highly restrictive mar-
ket share statistics in evaluating the potential anticompetitive ef-
fects of horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers under the
Clayton Act.18 The 1968 Guidelines was used extensively until the
late 1970's, when its use declined due to changing judicial attitudes
toward antimerger enforcement.19
In 1977 the Department issued its Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations (International Guide),20 designed "to provide a
working statement of operating government policy" and intended
to help businesses plan international transactions that would not
invoke Department challenges. 21 Although the International Guide
purported to follow the format of the 1968 Guidelines,22 in fact it
did not. While the 1968 Guidelines consists of specific and restric-
is Horizontal mergers, i.e. mergers between direct competitors in the same product line
and associated geographic markets, are likely to be challenged under the 1968 Guidelines at
market share levels as low as 5% for the acquiring firm or the acquired firm. 1968 GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 5, at 6883-84. With respect to vertical mergers, i.e. in which one company
acquires another who is a customer or supplier of the acquiring firm, challenges may be
issued at levels as low as 10% (supplier) and 6% (customer) of the market. Id. at 6885-86.
Conglomerate mergers, i.e. mergers which involve non-competitors and no customer-supplier
relationship, are likely to be challenged when they involve a likely entrant to the market
and any firm with a 10% or greater share of the market, provided that that firm is one of
the four largest firms and that the shares of the eight largest firms amount to 75% or more.
Id. at 6887-88. Additionally, the 1968 Guidelines indicates that where factors such as high
market concentration (a market where the shares of the four largest firms account for 75%
or more of the total) or a danger of reciprocity (favoring one's customer when making
purchases of a product which is sold by the customer) exist, there is a greater chance of a
challenge. Id. at 6884, 6888. Defenses to a charge of illegality are limited to the failing com-
pany doctrine and to proving economies. The former defense is used when one or more of
the parties to a merger was in a failing financial condition prior to the merger. Thus it is
argued that the merger should be allowed, since without it one or more of the merging
parties would be doomed to financial ruin. The latter defense, proving economies, or show-
ing improvements in efficiency through the merger, is applicable only in exceptional circum-
stances. Id. at 6884-885. See also Edwards, supra note 13, at 1545; Special Analysis, supra
note 7, at 13 (concerning restrictiveness of the 1968 Guidelines).
The 1968 Guidelines notes that while merger challenges may be made under the Sherman
Act, the majority of such challenges will fall under section 7 of the Clayton Act. See 1968
GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 6881.
" Although the 1968 Guidelines was intended to reflect the policies of the Department
exclusively, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) relied upon them as well. Edwards, supra
note 13, at 1545-46. See also Special Analysis, supra note 7, at 13 (discussion of declining
use of the 1968 Guidelines in the 1970's).
20 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL GUIDE].
" Id. at 1.
" See Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide for International Opera-
tions, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977).
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tive limitations, 3 the International Guide provides a much more
liberal and generalized approach, adopting no strict statistical
standards and setting forth a policy of nondiscrimination against
international operations.24 By the late 1970's anti-merger regula-
tion, especially in the international area, was clouded by inconsis-
tent departmental guidelines and evolving judicial standards.
Increasing denunciation of the theories underlying the 1968
Guidelines," coupled with the failure of the Department to period-
ically update them, 6 prompted the Department to draft a wholly
new set of merger guidelines. 7 The 1982 Guidelines represents
over a year of preparation and internal comment.28
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 GUIDELINES
A. General Considerations
The 1982 Guidelines, although representing modern economic
theory, retains the same basic approach to the analysis of mergers
as the 1968 Guidelines. The relevant market in which the effects of
the merger are to be measured is first defined, then the market
shares of the merging firms and the other firms within the relevant
market are calculated, and the resulting figures are used to mea-
sure the level of market concentration within the relevant market.
The decision to challenge a merger is largely based on the level of
market concentration.
While the procedural aspects of the 1982 Guidelines are not
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 15-18. See also Fugate, supra note 22, at
646 (comparison of 1968 Guidelines and the International Guide). For additional analysis
of the International Guide, see generally Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978); Baker,
Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255 (1978); Seki, The
Justice Department's New Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A Summary
and Evaluation, 32 Bus. LAW. 1633 (1977).
"' See Edwards, supra note 13, at 1550-51. The basic assumption underlying reliance on
concentration statistics, that market performance is tied to market concentration, has been
challenged by many scholars. See, e.g., Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and
Public Policy, 16 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1973); Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 826 (1977).
"6 See 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 14500, at 6881 (Aug. 9, 1982). While it was clearly in-
tended that the 1968 Guidelines be subjected to periodic revision, this never occurred. See
Joffe, Guidelines-Past, Present and Future, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 196 (1981).
'7 See Justice Department's New Merger Guidelines May be Ready By Winter, Baxter
Indicates, [Jul.-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1027, at A-4 (Aug. 13, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Baxter Interview].
See Special Analysis, supra note 7, at 14.
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new, there are important technical and policy changes. Under the
1982 Guidelines, the Department will not challenge vertical or con-
glomerate mergers in the absence of horizontal effects such as the
elimination of potential entrants to a market and the creation of
barriers to entry.29  The 1982 Guidelines also adopts the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) as a standard for measuring
market concentration and for issuing challenges.8 0 Basically, the
HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all the firms
in the relevant market.31 The HHI is preferable to the more estab-
lished four and eight firm formulas32 because it recognizes firms
outside the top group and gives proportionately greater weight to
the larger firms, corresponding to their relative importance in any
collusive activities.3 The HHI is primarily used to measure the ef-
fects of horizontal mergers. Such mergers will be challenged ac-
cording to anticipated changes in the HHI that arise following the
merger.-4 The effect of this standard is to create "safe harbors" in
which challenge by the Department is unlikely, thereby increasing
certainty for those persons contemplating mergers.
B. Market Definition Under the 1982 Guidelines
1. Introduction
The most critical area in international merger analysis is market
29 See 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 29-31, 34. This represents the current view of the
Department and of leading economists that the only significant anticompetitive effects from
mergers are horizontal in nature. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 231-38 (1978); Baxter Interview, supra note 27, at A-5.
30 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 17.
" For example, a market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20%,
and 20% has an HHI of 2600 (30 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 2600). The HHI ranges from 10,000
in the case of a pure monopoly to a number approaching zero in the case of an atomistic
market. Although it is desirable to include all firms in the calculation, lack of information
about small firms is not critical because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly. Id.
32 For example, the 1968 Guidelines considered only the market shares of the four largest
firms in the relevant market for purposes of determining market concentration. 1968 GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 5, at 6884.
11 See 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 27.
The general standards set forth are as follows:
a). Post-merger HHI below 1000 (unconcentrated market): Challenge unlikely.
b). Post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 (moderately concentrated):
1) Challenge unlikely where HHI increase is less than 100 points.
2) Challenge likely where HHI increase is more than 100 points.
c). Post-merger HHI over 1800 (highly concentrated):
1) Challenge unlikely where HHI increase is 50-100 points.
2) Borderline situation where HHI increase is 100 points or more.
Id. at 29-30.
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definition." The 1982 Guidelines emphasizes this process and, un-
like earlier procedures which largely ignored the international
arena, introduces a variety of updated analytical techniques.
The "unifying theme" of the 1982 Guidelines is the prevention
of mergers which create, enhance, or facilitate the existence of
"market power." 6 Market power is defined as the ability of a firm
(or group of firms acting in concert) profitably to maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant length of time.37
In order to ascertain the effects a merger may have on market
power, the 1982 Guidelines sets forth standards to define and mea-
sure the market for each product or service (hereinafter "product")
of the merging firms. s A market is formally defined by the 1982
Guidelines as follows:
[a] market consists of a group of products and an associated geo-
graphic area such that (in the absence of new entry) a hypotheti-
cal, unregulated firm that made all the sales of those products in
that area could increase its profits through a small but significant
and non-transitory increase in price (above prevailing or likely
levels).39
The 1982 Guidelines then turns to an analysis of. product and geo-
graphic markets.
2. Product Market Definition: Background
Product market definition has been of primary concern in both
Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases. Product market definition in
cases involving foreign commerce generally raises questions similar
to those arising in the domestic context. 40 In United States v. E.L
Market definition has been viewed by the courts as a process of extreme importance
because "unless this task is well done, the results will be distorted in terms of the conclusion
as to whether the law has been violated and what the decree should contain." United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 587 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). See also R. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 125 (1976) (importance of market definition in
merger cases).
" 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 12.
8 Id. at 12-13; Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937
(1981). The creation of market power is to be avoided since it transfers wealth from buyers
to sellers and results in a misallocation of resources. 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 13.
Proof of market power is vital to a finding of monopolization in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Furthermore, the main purpose of section 7 of the Clayton Act is to prevent
mergers that increase market power. See Landes & Posner, supra, at 937.
" 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 13.
39 Id.
40 See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANrIRusT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 208 (2d
1983] 803
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13:797
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane case),4 ' the Supreme
Court set forth what has come to be known as the "reasonable in-
terchangeability" test: The "market which one must study. . . will
vary with the part of commerce under consideration. The tests are
constant. That market is composed of products that have reasona-
ble interchangeability for the purpose for which they are pro-
duced-price, use and qualitites considered. ' 42 Additional factors
used in determining the relevant product market were set forth in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.43 These factors include: 1) the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, 2) unique production
facilities, 3) sensitivity to price changes, and 4) industry or public
recognition of the interchangeability. 44 The Court has also held
that the relevant product market need not be limited to a single
industry where inter-industry competition includes products of dif-
ferent characteristics but similar uses in a single market.45 While
the reasonable interchangeability test is widely used by United
ed. 1981).
41 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
" Id. at 394, 409. The primary legal issue in this Sherman Act section 2 case was whether
the relevant market consisted of cellophane or flexible packaging material in general. The
Court held that the applicable market covered all flexible packaging material including alu-
minum foil, glassine, and polyethylene, based on reasonable interchangeability, or cross-
elasticity of demand. Id.
Cross-elasticity of demand is defined as the effect on the quantity demanded of one prod-
uct given a change in the price of another product. A high cross-elasticity of demand indi-
cates that the products are good substitutes at the current price. See Landes & Posner,
supra note 37, at 960 n.39.
For a more complete treatment of the Cellophane case, see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST Eco-
NOMiCS AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 60-65 (1981).
-3 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Court used this language in adopting the Cellophane test:
"The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangea-
bility of use or cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it."
Id. at 325.
44 Id.
4" United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Court stated: "Thus
though the interchangeability of use may not be so complete and the cross elasticity of
demand not so immediate as in the case of most intraindustry mergers, there is over the
long run the kind of customer response to innovation and other competitive stimuli that
brings the competition between these two industries within § 7's competition-preserving
proscriptions." Id. at 455. In the Continental Can Case, the second largest metal container
manufacturer bought the third largest glass container manufacturer (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.).
The Court analyzed the historical competition among glass, metal, and plastic containers
and found that the reasonable interchangeability test was met. Id. at 447-58. Note that in so
ruling the Court in effect changed what started out as a conglomerate (between non-compet-
itors) merger into a horizontal (between direct competitors) merger. See E. KINTNER, supra
note 16, at 227. The ruling in Continental Can was made over strong dissent by Justice
Harlan who found the combination of glass and metal containers into a single market "com-
pletely fanciful." 378 U.S. 441, 469-70.
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States courts, it has been disregarded where other factors such as
price and market dominance overshadow the products'
interchangeability."'
Product market definition under the 1968 Guidelines utilized a
version of the reasonable interchangeability test.4 7 This market
definition section was soundly criticized as "so loose and unprofes-
sional as to be positively embarassing."148
3. Product Market Definition Under the 1982 Guidelines
The first step in market definition under the 1982 Guidelines is
to decide which product(s) to include in the relevant market of the
merging firms. The relevant product market is defined as "a group
of products such that a hypothetical firm that was the only present
and future seller of those products could raise price [sic] profita-
bly."'4 9 The method of product market definition under the new
guidelines involves the establishment of a provisional market
which includes those products that the merging firms' customers
view as good substitutes at prevailing prices." This provisional
market is subject to expansion or contraction in light of any rele-
vant evidence dealing with product substitutability."1 Products will
46 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). The Court
found that insulated aluminum cable and insulated copper cable did not constitute a single
product market. This finding was made despite evidence that: the two products were func-
tionally interchangeable by the users; the conductor cable industry did not differentiate be-
tween copper and aluminum insulated products; both could be produced interchangeably on
the same machinery; and neither had distinct customers or specialized vendors. The Court
noted that insulated aluminum conductor cable was generally priced 50 to 60% less than
equivalent copper conductor and that the dominance of insulated aluminum conductor in
the insulated overhead line market (75% of the total market) gave the product advantages
such that separate product markets existed. Id. at 273-77.
'7 See 1968 GuIDELINES, supra note 5, at 6884.
Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REv. 13 (Spring 1969). For particular criticism, see R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 130-33.
" 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 15. Prices could only be raised profitably where there
were no readily available product alternatives because, given such alternatives, an attempt
to raise prices would theoretically result in a buyer shift to products that were acceptable
substitutes. Id. This is the economic theory of cross-elasticity of demand. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 37, at 960 n.39.
50 1982 GuIDELINES, supra note 1, at 15.
" Id. at 17. Particular weight will be given to the following factors concerning product
substitutability:
(1) Evidence of buyers' perceptions that the products are or are not substitutes,
particularly if those buyers have shifted purchases between the products in re-
sponse to changes in relative prices or other competitive variables;(2) Similarities
or differences between the products in customary usage, design, physical composi-
tion and other technical characteristics;(3) Similarities or differences in the price
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also be added to the market if a significant percentage of buyers of
products already included would be likely to shift to these addi-
tional products in response to a price increase."' In order to ap-
proximate this process, a 5% price increase is hypothesized, and
the number of buyers likely to shift to the other products within a
year is calculated. 3 This procedure is designed to eliminate the po-
tential weakness in basing a product market solely on existing pat-
terns of supply and demand where those patterns might change
substantially due to a price increase."4 The provisional market will
be expanded, if necessary, until the profitability standard stated
above is met." At this point the product group is termed the "rele-
vant product" market.6
Once the relevant product market is defined, the 1982 Guide-
lines then identifies the firms that produce and sell the relevant
product. In most cases, these will be the firms that currently pro-
duce and sell the relevant product.57 However, the number of firms
may be expanded in three circumstances: 1) where firms may use
existing facilities to switch to production of the relevant product in
response to a price increase,58 2) where recycled or reconditioned
goods are good substitutes," or 3) where the relevant product is
produced only for internal consumption as part of a vertically in-
tegrated firm and may be induced by a price increase to sell in an
outside market.60
Thus, in product market definition, the 1982 Guidelines contin-
ues to follow the economic theory of cross-elasticity of demand as
expressed in the earlier case law and guidelines as the reasonable
interchangeability test, while it changes to meet the complaints of
movements of the products over a period of years; and(4) Evidence of sellers' per-
ceptions that the products are or are not substitutes, particularly if business deci-
sions have been based on the perceptions.
Id.




Id. at 17 n.12.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 20.
9 Firms that recondition or recycle such products will be included in the market. Id.
40 The Department recognizes, however, that vertically integrated firms could actually
frustrate an effort by the sellers of the relevant product to exercise market power through
sales of relevant products. The Department will consider this in evaluating internally con-
sumed production. Id. at 21 n.20.
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critics, especially in the area of product substitution.6 Perhaps the
most distinctive feature is the hypothetical 5% price increase test.
The principle of cross-elasticity of demand basically examines the
effects of a small increase in price on the demand of a product and
its substitutes. The 5% increase, while arguably somewhat arbi-
trary, is designed to replicate the effects of a small increase in
price. Ostensibly, the application of this test will provide a practi-
cal standard that is economically defensible.62
4. Geographic Market Definition: Background
Geographic market definition has developed in a fashion similar
to that of product market definition. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States6" the Court put geographic market definition into
perspective:
[J]ust as a product market may have Section 7 significance as the
proper "line of commerce," so may a geographic submarket be
considered the appropriate "section of the country." . . .Con-
gress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of
the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one. The geo-
graphic market selected must, therefore, both "correspond to the
commercial realities" of the industries and be economically signif-
icant. Thus, although the geographic market in some instances
may encompass the entire Nation, under other circumstances it
may be as small as a single metropolitan area."
The following year, in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank,65 the Court again emphasized the pragmatic nature of geo-
graphic market definition, noting that the geographic market does
not necessarily coincide with where the parties do business, but
instead is the area of competition in which the effect of the merger
will be "direct and immediate."66 Geographic market definition
does not require a precise delineation by "metes and bounds," but
61 See R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 132. Professor Posner's main problem with product
market definition under the 1968 Guidelines was the lack of any reference to substitutes in
production. The 1982 Guidelines deals with this problem specifically by recognizing firms
that do not presently produce the relevant product but would do so in response to a 5%
price increase. See 1982 GUDELINES, supra note 1, at 19-20.
" See Antitrust Division's Chief Economist Defends Value of New Merger Guidelines,
42 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at 1302 (June 24, 1982) (emphasizing
practical value of this test).
- 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
" Id. at 336-37.
- 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Id. at 357.
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only that the government prove the merger may have an anticom-
petitive effect somewhere in the United States.6 7 The relevant geo-
graphic market has been described as the area "in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchasers can practically turn for sup-
plies"68 and must take into account the area in which the relevant
products are marketed by the acquired firm. 9
While the United States courts have thus presented a relatively
liberal picture of geographic market definition domestically, they
have been reluctant to extend the market beyond national bounda-
ries. 70 This is apparently due to reading the language of the Clay-
ton Act prohibiting those mergers which lessen competition "in
any section of the country"7 1 as precluding consideration of inter-
national markets. However, while the effects of a merger must be
evaluated within the United States, there is no reason to exclude
the definition of international markets in so far as the effects are
felt within the country.72
A few courts have accepted this concept and have recognized
markets extending beyond the United States. In United States v.
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.)73 the court enjoined the acquisition of the
Potash Company of America by Standard Oil, a major purchaser of
potash. While noting that the anticompetitive effect of the acquisi-
tion must be felt in the United States to constitute a violation of
the Clayton Act, the court stated that "United States producers
sell potash for consumption, not only in the United States, but also
07 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1965).
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963). See also Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 20 (1961) (similar test used in Sherman Act case).
' United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1961).
70 See, e.g., Platt Saco Lowell Ltd. v. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,898 (N.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 766, 780 (Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). But see Yoerg, Foreign
Entry and the Potential Competition Doctrine Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 973, 990-91 nn.73-74 (1978) (citing cases suggesting worldwide market may
be appropriate).
71 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §18 (West 1973).
72 It seems to me that there has almost been a jurisprudential determination that the
process of market definition steps at the water's edge whatever the realities. I have
heard people ascribe this result, quite wrongly I think, to the language in Section
7 .... It is true that Section 7 does only talk about competitive effects in the
United States, but you cannot determine the competitive effects in the United
States without looking at a properly defined market, and if a properly defined
market is an international market, you have to look at the international market.
Interview with William F. Baxter, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 27 (1982). See also Yoerg, supra
note 70, at 988-92 (espousing the same concept).
13 253 F. Supp. 196 (N.J. 1966).
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in the rest of the Free World. Therefore, the market in which the
potash producers must compete is measured by consumption in
the United States and the rest of the Free World. ' 7 4 In another
section 7 challenge, United States v. Tracinda Investment Corp.7 5
the court refused to enjoin the partial acquisition of Columbia Pic-
tures by a firm which had a controlling interest in another major
film producer. The Tracinda court found that the relevant geo-
graphic market in motion picture production and distribution was
worldwide. This finding was based on the competition of foreign
films within the United States, foreign distribution by United
States firms, and the worldwide competition for supplies. 6
The 1968 Guidelines basically adopted the existing geographic
definitions and did not deal specifically with the international mar-
ket problem.77
5. Geographic Market Definition under the 1982 Guidelines
Geographic market definition under the 1982 Guidelines begins
by recognizing that a single firm may operate in a number of eco-
nomically discrete geographic markets.7 8 These geographic markets
may be as small as a part of a city or as large as the entire world. 9
The Department defines the geographic market as "a geographic
area such that a hypothetical firm that was the only present or
future producer of the relevant product in that area could profita-
bly raise price." 80
The process used to define the geographic market begins with
the establishment of a provisional market, based on the shipping
patterns of the merging firms and their competitors.8 The geo-
graphic market is then further defined by analyzing the effects of a
hypothetical 5 % price increase on this provisional market. If a firm
outside the provisional market could readily respond to the price
increase by providing the relevant product to buyers within the
market in sufficient quantities and at comparable prices, an at-
71 Id. at 210.
71 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
76 Id. at 1105. See Baker, Market Definition and International Competition, 15 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POLIrlcs 377, 385-89 (1983) (discussion of Standard Oil and Tracinda and the
recognition of international markets).
77 See 1968 GUIDELIS, supra note 5, at 6883.
78 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 21. The Department will determine the geographic
market(s) for each product market of each merging firm.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 22.
81 Id.
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tempt to raise price would not be profitable. Thus the market
would have been too narrowly defined.82 The provisional market is
subject to expansion in light of any relevant evidence until the
profitability standard is met." Where geographic price discrimina-
tion is possible, 4 more narrowly defined geographic markets ori-
ented to those buyers who are subject to the exercise of market
power will be established. 8
The 1982 Guidelines states that these geographic market stan-
dards will apply to both international and domestic markets.88
This impact, however, will be tempered somewhat in its interna-
tional application due to the existence of constraints not present in
a purely domestic context.8 7 Examples of such constraints include
changes in exchange rates, tariffs, and general political conditions
that may limit the ability of firms outside the United States to
respond to domestic price increases. 8
The new guidelines are structured along established geographic
8' Id. at 23.
83 While consideration will be given to all relevant factors concerning geographic sub-
stitutability, weight also will be given to the following factors:
1) Evidence of buyers' actually having shifted their purchases among sellers at
different geographic locations, especially if the shifts corresponded to changes in
relative price or other competitive variables;
2) Similarities or differences in the price movements of the relative product in
different geographic areas over a period of years;
3) Transportation costs;
4) Costs of local distribution; and
5) Excess capacity by firms outside the provisional market.
Id. at 23-24.
An example of geographic price discrimination is "charging different prices net of
transportation costs for the same buyers in different places." Id. at 24.
88 Id.
so Id.
87 Id. at 25.
Id. at 24-25. While the 1982 Guidelines does not provide specific examples of such
barriers to foreign firms, it is assumed that these would include immigration laws, more
stringent tax regulations controlling a foreign entity's United States operations, laws sub-
jecting foreign assets to seizure in the event of a national emergency, and restrictions on
foreign participation in the defense, communication, transportation, energy, banking, and
insurance industries. Anti-dumping laws and other protectionist activities could also be fac-
tors. Export restrictions by the foreign firm's home nation as well as potential currency
devaluation and other uncertainties of international trade may also be considered. Economic
factors such as higher transportation costs and lack of familiarity with United States busi-
ness practices could also be taken into account. See Yoerg, supra note 70, at 992-93 (sug-
gesting that these factors be considered in challenges under section 7 of the Clayton Act).
See also Almond & Goldstein, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: An Over-




market notions, but also take into account suggestions made by
scholars since the 1968 Guidelines was issued. 9 The major changes
from the 1968 Guidelines come in the area of international geo-
graphic market definition. Apparently, the 'Department has been
influenced in its thinking by prominent scholars who have sug-
gested that when a foreign firm has some (non-trivial) sales in a
market, all its sales, wherever made, should be considered a part of
the market.90 This would recognize the ability of the foreign firm
to increase sales in the relevant market given a price increase.9 1
This concept is reflected in the 5% hypothetical increase test and
the explicit recognition by the 1982 Guidelines of the importance
of extranational competition." This represents a compromise be-
tween excluding or including foreign production in market share
calculations on the part of the Department leadership who were in
basic agreement with the scholarly suggestions in this area, but
were seeking a simple mechanism to reflect the concept in the 1982
Guidelines."
When foreign competition is considered, it will usually have the
effect of enlarging the relevant market, thus making a finding of
market power less likely. Correspondingly, fewer mergers should be
challenged when the geographic market expands to include foreign
competition. Once the relevant market is defined, the market
shares are calculated by using the total sales or the total capacity
of the appropriate firms.94 The HHI is then employed to evaluate
the market concentration and to determine if a challenge is
appropriate.98
6. International Impact of the 1982 Guidelines
a. Introduction
The international impact of the 1982 Guidelines is a function of
both the specific provisions of the guidelines and the jurisdictional
reach of the United States antitrust law. Unless a merger involving
89 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 13.
" Landes & Posner, supra note 37, at 964; Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geograph-
ical Market Definition in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 72-80 (1973).
9' Landes & Posner, supra note 37, at 963.
92 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 23. See also Baker, supra note 76, at 394 (recogniz-
ing validity of Landes and Posner's theory but acknowledging practical problems with it).
93 See Baxter Seeks Greater Consideration of International Competition in Merger
Cases, supra note 10, at A-17 to A-19.
"4 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 15.
96 Id. at 17.
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international business falls within a United States court's jurisdic-
tion, the 1982 Guidelines will necessarily be inapplicable. There-
fore, a brief examination of jurisdictional issues is necessary before
turning to an evaluation of the guidelines' effects on the various
types of mergers involving international commerce.
b. Jurisdictional Aspects
In order for a federal court to issue a binding adjudication in any
action initiated under the 1982 Guidelines, the court must have
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the parties,
and proper venue. Therefore the jurisdicational reach of the Sher-
man Act and Clayton Act over mergers involving international in-
terests is of extreme importance.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's competence to
hear a particular category of cases. 6 It is a threshold issue that
must be addressed in any case involving the application of United
States antitrust law to foreign commerce.9 7 Subject matter jurisdic-
tion in the area of antitrust is governed by specific statutory provi-
sions. The Sherman Act extends its prohibitions to all persons
monopolizing or restraining trade or commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations," thereby constituting a strong as-
sertion of Congressional power over commerce. 99
" Maines, Antitrust Personal Jursidiction and Venue in International Trade, in 17TH
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEMINAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 73 (Practicing Law Institute 1977). Subject matter jurisdiction is a requirement sepa-
rate from personal jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to regulate foreign commerce.
It is based upon the Constitution (Article I, Section 8, clause 3) and is imple-
mented by statute. Subject matter jurisdiction is the threshold issue in any dis-
pute to determine whether the antitrust laws have been violated by conduct-in-
volving foreign commerce. It is not to be confused with whether, in other respects,
a substantive offense has occurred.
Kiltgaard, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in 17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEMI-
NAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (Practicing Law Institute 1979)
(citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), afl'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)).
- 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (1973). See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 135 (3d ed. 1981) (discussion of jurisdictional issues in this area); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 708-17 (1977) (definition of interstate and foreign com-
merce; Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign commerce).
The language of the Sherman Act has been described as extending "to the utmost ex-
tent of [Congress'] constitutional power." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.58 (1944).
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In the majority of cases jurisdiction over mergers is governed by
section 7 of the Clayton Act.100 The provisions of section 7 were
significantly strengthened by the Antitrust Procedural Improve-
ment Act of 1980.101 Prior to 1980, both the acquiring and the ac-
quired firm were required to be "engaged in commerce."'0 2 The
wording of this provision suggested limitations on its extraterrito-
rial application. 0 3 Further, section 7 applied only to corporations,
not to individuals." 4 As rewritten, section 7 expresses Congress'
desire to reinforce the impact of the Clayton Act on foreign com-
merce' 0 5 by expanding the applicability of the Act to situations
where "any person engaged in commerce or in any activity affect-
ing commerce" acquires the stock or assets of another such person
and where "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country" the effect might be to
lessen competition.106 This potentially expands "section 7's juris-
dictional reach to the full extent of the Sherman Act and of Con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Cause.
1 0 7
In view of its expanded jurisdictional reach, it is anticipated that
most merger challenges will be made under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. Nevertheless, where a potential jurisdictional problem
under section 7 does exist, the Sherman Act could reach any acqui-
100 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1973).
'0 Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (1980).
"' The "engaged in commerce" requirement was not satisfied merely by showing an effect
on commerce. See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271
(1975).
lo The statute was applicable only "where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1973). This led to uncertainty concerning the stat-
ute's reach into foreign commerce. See, e.g., Crane Fruehauf Ltd. v. Fruehauf Corp., 1977-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,708 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 15-17.
104 Section 7 begins by providing that "[n]o corporation engaged in commerce. 15
U.S.C.A. § 18 (1973) (emphasis added).
100 [The Antitrust Subcommittee] is concerned about the issue of the application of
section 7 to acquisitions of American corporations by foreign firms who may be
likely potential entrants into the American market place and thus may not be
engaged in U.S. foreign commerce. According to former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral John Shenefield, under the current strictures of the law, "The Department of
Justice cannot reach mergers or acquisitions involving companies that only 'affect
commerce' whether those companies are foreign or domestic."
H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980) (quoting Hearings on Antitrust Procedural
Improvements Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
871].
'" Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (1980).
107 H.R. REP. No. 871, supra note 105, at 2.
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sition that has a substantial effect on the foreign or domestic trade
of the United States 08 and would probably be used despite its
more stringent substantive standards.10 9
Historically, United States courts have generally been willing to
extend federal antitrust law to violations occurring outside the
boundaries of the country, even though the Supreme Court re-
jected initial attempts to apply antitrust law extraterritorially. In
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,110 both plaintiff and
defendant were American corporations operating banana planta-
tions in Central America. The suit, brought privately by American
Banana Co., alleged that the United Fruit Co. had monopolized
the Central American banana trade with the United States and
sought relief under the Sherman Act. The Court, in dismissing the
claim, found it "startling" that the plaintiff would argue expanding
the Sherman Act's reach to include acts occurring within the juris-
diction of other nations."'
108 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1973). Section 2
provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a felony." Id. § 2. Thus the Sherman Act, unlike the pre-1980 Clayton Act, neither
required both parties to be "engaged in commerce" nor limited its application to corporate
entities. For merger cases under the Sherman Act, see, e.g., United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (Mass. 1950); United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967
Trade Cas. (CCH) 572,001 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
109 Under the substantive requirements of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show a
"specific intent" on the defendant's part to unreasonably restrict trade through acquisition
or merger. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-33 (1947). Under section 7
of the Clayton Act, however, in recognition of its design to arrest "incipient" threats, the
plaintiff must show only the "tendency" toward monopoly or the "reasonable likelihood" of
a substantial lessening of competition through merger or acquisition. United States v. Penn-
Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1963). See also Donovan, The Legality of Acquisi-
tions and Mergers Involving American and Foreign Corporations Under the United States
Antitrust Laws-Part II, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 38, 48-54 (legislative history of the Clayton Act
and the incipiency standard).
110 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
It is obvious, however stated, that:
the plaintiff's case depends on several rather startling propositions. In the first
place the acts causing the damage were done, so far as it appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states .... [W]ords hav-
ing universal scope, such as "Every contract in restraint of trade," "Every person
who shall monopolize," etc., will be taken as a matter of course to mean only ev-
eryone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be
able to catch. In the case of the present statute the improbability of the United
States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious,
yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue. We
think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not
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While American Banana has been recognized as a landmark
statement of the presumptive territoriality of penal legislation, 12
United States courts subsequently adopted what has come to be
known as the "effects" test. Under this test, jurisdiction is asserted
if conduct violative of the antitrust laws, no matter where per-
formed, has an effect within the United States. This jurisdictional
concept was first enunciated in United States v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America (Alcoa). " ' In Alcoa, two French corporations,
two British corporations, and a Canadian subsidiary of Alcoa were
accused of a conspiracy to divide the world aluminum market
through participation in a European cartel. In his opinion, Judge
Learned Hand extended subject matter jurisdiction to cover such
foreign activity where there was an intent to affect United States
imports or exports, coupled with an actual impact.11 4 International
criticism of this assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been
harsh, "5 and United States Courts have retreated somewhat from
their initial stance, adopting a much more balanced approach such
as that adopted in Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of
America."6
In Timberlane, a United States company claimed that acts taken
by the defendant and other firms in Honduras unlawfully pre-
vented the company from establishing operations in the Central
American nation. The Timberlane court, while recognizing the
general validity of the effects test, felt that the interests of foreign
nations should be given greater consideration. Thus the court
adopted a three part test designed to: (1) examine the actual and
intended effects on United States commerce, (2) examine the mag-
nitude of the impact, and (3) interject notions of international
within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned.
Id. at 356-57.
"I See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 141.
3' 148 F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1945).
"I Id. at 443. See also INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 6 ("When foreign transac-
tions have a substantial and forseeable effect on U.S. Commerce, they are subject to U.S.
law regardless of where they take place"). For other cases applying this test, see, e.g., Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Westinghouse v. Rio
Algon Corp., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114
(S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
"' See supra note 8. The primary concern is with the perceived absence of a limit on the
United States assertion of the effects test and not with the theory underlying the exercise of
jurisdiction. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Proposed Federal Criminal
Codes: Senate Bill 1630 and House Bill 1647, 12 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 305, 314 (1982).
116 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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comity." 7 Timberlane and its progeny"1 s reflect the current United
States approach to extraterritorial application of antitrust law
which deemphasizes the effects test in favor of a comity analysis.11 9
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's ability to exert power
over the parties to an antitrust proceeding and to bind them by its
adjudication.120 The due process clause of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution 121 imposes the basic limitations on
the power of the courts to exert personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff
is subject to personal jurisdiction upon initiating a suit, while a
defendant's actual presence in the applicable judicial district is
usually sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 22 A defendant
not physically present must have "certain minimum contacts" with
the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
" Id. at 611-14. International comity is defined as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citi-
zens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
334 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965) (factor to be considered under international comity).
'is In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979),
the court adopted a similar approach while setting forth a slightly different list of factors for
comity considerations. The Timberlane analysis was also followed in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and in Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus. Co., 473 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980). But see
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (court failed to follow
Timberlane). For recent analysis of Timberlane and extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Gill,
Two Cheers for Timberlane, 10 REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE
3 (1980); Shenefield, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust-New Variations on a Familiar
Theme, reprinted in [1969-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,424 (Feb. 2,
1981); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
Despite the willingness of the United States courts to soften the effects test, other
countries have enacted retaliatory legislation. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application of
the Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 577, 592-608 (1981); Note, A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral
Agreements in Resolving Disputes Between Sovereigns Arising From Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of Antitrust Law: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 58-63
(1983).
120 See Maines, supra note 96, at 73. While personal jurisdiction is recognized as a sepa-
rate consideration from subject matter jurisdiction, the distinction seems to be blurred
somewhat in the antitrust field due to the existence of both criminal and civil sanctions.
Defendants in civil cases are subject to the "minimum contacts" test. See infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process clause states that "[njo person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id.
1'l See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 119.
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'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' "123 in order
for a court to properly maintain personal jurisdiction. 2 The "min-
imum contacts" test has been satisfied with respect to foreign anti-
trust defendants in a variety of situations. For example, where a
foreign firm transacts business in a jurisdiction at a level "as to be
within the practical everyday business or commercial concept of
doing or carrying on business of a substantial character,"' 5 even if
these business activities are unrelated to plaintiff's antitrust allega-
tions, 26 personal jurisdiction is properly established. Other bases
for establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in-
clude local actions of agents127  and acts by United States
subsidiaries.1 28
M" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
11, The applicability of International Shoe to foreign defendants may be limited, since
the defendant in that case was a United States corporation acting in a federal system in
which other states would be compelled to enforce the judgment. This requirement does not
exist in the international context. See P. AREEDA, supra note 98, at 136. However, while
International Shoe dealt with jurisdictional power of states, it is generally applicable to any
finding of personal jurisdiction. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 111. Subse-
quent cases have noted the necessity of some act "by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, reh'g denied,
358 U.S. 858 (1958). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978); Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327-30 (1980). For
an analysis of International Shoe and its progeny in an international context, see Comment,
The Minimum Contacts Standard and Alien Defendants, 12 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 783
(1980).
1 O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1974).
Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 410-21 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also
Gutor Int'l, A.G. v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938, 947-48 (1st Cir. 1974) (initiating
litigation subjected plaintiff to antitrust counterclaim); El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co.,
444 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (scattered contacts sufficient if forming the basis of the
antitrust claim); Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1981) (personal jurisdiction sus-
tained over French winemakers who had contracted for exclusive distributorship); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 163,678 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (conspiratorial meetings within the United
States). But see Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 510 F. Supp. 741, 743 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (no personal jurisdiction despite substantial sales through exclusive United States dis-
tributor); Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980) (no jurisdiction despite scattered contacts and operations of
United States subsidiary).
1M7 See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 419 (9th Cir.
1977).
"' See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 327-28
(E.D. Pa. 1975). For a detailed discussion of personal jurisdiction over foreign entities, see
generally 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BRawsTEs, supra note 40, at 109-29.
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Due process also requires that the plaintiff provide for proper
service of process. Service of process requirements relevant to in-
ternational antitrust matters can be found in rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 section 12 of the Clayton Act,130 and in
various state "long-arm" statutes."'
The forum in which suit is brought must be proper in terms of
venue as well. Venue has been defined as the "place or places
where an action may be properly instituted and the suit deter-
mined, providing the court has subject matter jurisdiction and the
requisite jurisdiction over the defendant."' 32 Pertinent antitrust
venue statutes can be found in section 12' s" and section 413 of the
Clayton Act.
"' Rule 4(d) provides for service on both resident and nonresident parties. Under rule
4(e) and (f), extraterritorial service is permitted where such service is authorized under fed-
eral or state law. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 381 (1965); Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1041 (1972); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.P.A., 244 F. Supp. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
SO Provided that the case meets the venue requirements set forth in section 12, see infra
note 133 and accompanying text, service of process against a corporation may be achieved
"wherever it may be found." 15 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1973). Thus an alien corporation may be
properly served at its home office abroad. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Service upon a United States subsidi-
ary of an alien corporation has been held to constitute service upon the parent. See, e.g.,
Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,092 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
M' Where the plaintiff is not proceeding under the venue provisions of section 12 he is
subject to the varying requirements of the applicable state statutes. For a review of these
statutes, see Special Project, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations-A Survey of
U.S. Practice, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345 (1976); see also 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
supra note 40, at 131-32 (service problems associated with state statutes).
132 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 1O.140(1.-i) (2d ed. 1983).
'-- 15 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1973). Under section 12 of the Clayton Act, antitrust actions may be
brought against a corporate defendant in the district in which it is an inhabitant, or in any
district in which it is found or transacts business. See Arco Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Body
Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400, 404 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966) (corpora-
tion is "inhabitant" or resident of state of incorporation); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359, 361 (1976) ("found" means doing business to extent actual pres-
ence is established); Lippa & Co. v. Lerox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 175 (Vt. 1969) ("transacting
business" construed through qualitative analysis of contacts between district and corpora-
tion in question). For a comprehensive list of factors used in determining whether a corpora-
tion is "transacting business," see Victor, In Personam Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of
Process in Antitrust Cases, in 17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEMINAR, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 61-63 (Practicing Law Institute 1977).
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1973). Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, antitrust defendants may
be sued where they reside, where they are found, or where they have an agent. While section
4 is primarily invoked against individual defendants, it may also be used against corpora-
tions. See Learning Systems, Inc. v. Levin, 351 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
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In addition to the concept of international comity, 3 ' antitrust
suits dealing with foreign commerce often involve other interna-
tional doctrines or defenses that limit the assertion of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. These include sovereign immunity,1 3 the Act of
State Doctrine,13 7 and sovereign compulsion.138
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
ISO The general rule of sovereign immunity is that "a state is immune from the exercise by
another state of jurisdiction to enforce rules of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 65 (1965). Sovereign immunity also extends to
"a corporation created under its laws and exercising functions comparable to those of an
agency of the state." Id. § 66(g). The doctrine does not apply, however, to "a proceeding
arising out of commercial activity outside its territory." Id. § 69. Generally, United States
courts have recognized the immunity of a foreign sovereign for its public actions but not for
its private or commercial activities. See Letter of Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate (May
19, 1952), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) (formally adopting this position). See also Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587
(1943) (recognizing Department of State policy on sovereign immunity as binding on judici-
ary); Note, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L
L. 75 (1964).
In 1976 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611)
[hereinafter cited as FSIA]. The FSIA adopted the position set forth in the Tate letter
(commercial acts of the sovereign subject to suit), see supra, and gave the judicial branch
exclusive responsibility in ruling on immunity claims. For detailed treatments of the FSIA,
see Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN L. REV. 385 (1982);
Von Mehrer, The Foreign Sovereign Immunitites Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
33 (1978). For antitrust cases involving sovereign immunity, see United States v. Deutsches
Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (French corporation of which French
government owned 11/15ths not immune to suit); In re Investigation of World Arrange-
ments, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.C. 1952) (immunity granted to British Oil Company controlled by
British Government); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964) (contra
Tate letter); National City Bank of N.Y. v. China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (adopting Tate let-
ter); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd,
649 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1036 (1982) (district court held
OPEC nations not engaging in commercial activities; decision affirmed under Act of State
Doctrine). The sovereign immunity defense is jurisdictional and must be considered before
reaching the antitrust aspects of a case. 477 F. Supp. at 564-65.
" The Act of State Doctrine is often confused with the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and sovereign compulsion. Where the adjudication of an antitrust claim requires the court
to make judgments about the conduct of a foreign sovereign not a party to the suit that
might conflict with the responsibilities of the executive branch for United States foreign
relations, the Act of State Doctrine may preclude a decision by the court. See 1 J. ATWOOD
& K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 238. This Doctrine has been described by United States
courts as follows:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign pow-
ers as between themselves.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
The Act of State Doctrine was first used in the antitrust area in American Banana Co. v.
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c. Impact on Mergers Involving Foreign Commerce
Mergers involving foreign commerce can be grouped into several
categories, each possessing characteristics which will determine to
a large extent the impact of the 1982 Guidelines.
First, there are cases involving the acquisition of a foreign firm
by a United States company. Given the nationality of the acquiring
firm, jurisdiction poses few problems as long as there is a measura-
ble effect in the United States. In United States v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co.,"' a large United States brewer acquired a majority
interest in a Canadian brewer, John Labatt, Ltd. This acquisition
was found illegal under section 7 of the Clayton Act since it af-
fected competition between Schlitz and a United States subsidiary
of Labatt within the United States. Under similar circumstances
the 1982 Guidelines would apply as in any domestic context with
the possible exception of the expansion of the relevant market to
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In American Banana, the plaintiff complained that
the United Fruit Co. had persuaded the Government of Costa Rica to seize American Ba-
nana's plantation and to eliminate the plaintiff from competition. Justice Holmes utilized
the Act of State Doctrine to dismiss both the government's seizure and United Fruit's per-
suasive role in the foreign sovereign's act. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40,
at 239-40.
Where there are substantial private conspiratorial acts within the United States, however,
leading to discriminatory legislation in foreign nations, the Act of State Doctrine will not
bar a suit against private defendants. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1967). Detailed discussion of this complex area is beyond the scope of this Note. For fur-
ther discussion in this area, see 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 238-52;
Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: The Need for a Commercial Exception in Antitrust
Litigation, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 813 (1981); Timbera, Sovereign Immunity And Act of
State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1976).
SS The limiting concept of sovereign compulsion arises when the defendant argues that
his alleged antitrust violations should be excused because he was acting under compulsion
from a foreign sovereign. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 40, at 260. A particularly
cogent statement of the limits of the sovereign compulsion doctrine in the international
antitrust field can be found in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center,
1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), judgment modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965):
In the present case .... defendants' activities were not required by the laws of
Switzerland. They were agreements formulated privately without compulsion on
the part of the Swiss government. It is clear that these private agreements were
then recognized as facts of economic and industrial life by that nation's govern-
ment. Nonetheless, the fact that the Swiss government may, as a practical matter,
approve of the effects of this private activity cannot convert what is essentially a
vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting from foreign
governmental mandate.
Id. 77,456-57.
"1 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S.
1021 (1967).
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include sales of the parent company outside the United States, de-
pending on the individual circumstances.
Mergers between United States and foreign firms often involve
the elimination of potential foreign entrants to United States mar-
kets instead of actual, direct anticompetitive effects. In United
States v. Gillette Co.," °0 the largest United States manufacturer of
safety razors and blades merged with the third largest European
manufacturer of electric razors, Braun, A.G. The anticipated do-
mestic effect of this merger was the elimination of Braun as a po-
tential entrant to the United States market, thus enhancing Gil-
lette's dominant position. Mergers similar to the one in Gillette
would be affected by the 1982 Guidelines in several ways. First,
Braun could be identified through the regular market definition
process as a producer of the relevant product (if electric shavers
are determined to be substitutes for safety razors) " " and as a part
of the relevant geographic market.4 2 If this were not the case,
Braun might still be covered by the guidelines as a potential en-
trant, thus creating a horizontal effect from a non-horizontal
merger. "' 3 Where a merger involves the acquisition of a foreign
firm that is an importer without a United States affiliate, as was
the case in several merger challenges,' 4 the relative importance at-
tached to the competitive impact of the imported products is de-
termined by the guidelines' recognition of potential foreign re-
straints on the supply response of foreign firms to price
increases."5
The next category represents cases in which a foreign company
merges with a United States firm. These cases involve many of the
same considerations discussed above. However, previous challenges
to this type of merger have often produced strong reaction by for-
eign governments. For example, in the British Petroleum-Sohio
case, 4 6 the Department challenged the merger between British Pe-
troleum and Standard Oil Co. of Ohio under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. The Department claimed that since Sohio had thirty per-
340 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,691 (Mass. 1975) (consent decree).
141 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945);
Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973).
' See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
46 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(consent decree).
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cent of the Ohio market and since British Petroleum, already
operating elsewhere in the United States, was a potential entrant
into Ohio, anticompetitive effects would flow from the proposed
merger. The case was settled under a consent decree, with Sohio
divesting part of its Ohio operations. 147 This challenge produced
strong British criticism stemming from that government's willing-
ness to allow the entry of large United States companies into
United Kingdom markets."48 It is difficult to predict whether such
foreign disapproval would call for a different result under the 1982
Guidelines. Because of the recent tendency in both the 1982
Guidelines and in cases like Timberlane to recognize foreign inter-
ests, similar foreign concerns might carry greater weight today.
The final category of cases involves the merger of two foreign
companies. Cases of this nature potentially stretch the jurisdic-
tional reach of the United States antitrust laws to their limits,
even in light of effects felt in the United States. In United States
v. CIBA Corp. ' 9 jurisdiction over a potential merger between two
Swiss companies, CIBA, Ltd. and J.R. Geigy, S.A., was based on
the existence of their United States subsidiaries. Absent these sub-
sidiary operations, however, such a challenge would have been dif-
ficult to make under the present standards. It is in cases of this
nature that comity will play the largest role.'50
Where jurisdictional hurdles can be overcome, the 1982 Guide-
lines would theoretically apply as in any other case. The impact of
a merger between two foreign firms could affect United States in-
terests in a variety of ways, depending on the facts of the individ-
ual case. For example, assume a merger between London, Ltd. and
Schmidt, GmbH, both foreign firms which manufacture portable
black and white television sets (the relevant product market) over-
seas and which sell them only in the United States. London and
Schmidt are the only foreign sellers of the relevant product in the
United States and compete with United States firms which have
no significant sales in the relevant product abroad. Under these
circumstances the relevant geographic market would almost cer-
tainly be measured within the United States and since London and
Schmidt have no other sales of the relevant product, only the
' See Fugate, Problems in Transnational Acquisitions and Mergers, 2 CANADA-UNITED
STATES L.J. 190, 195 (1979).
148 Id.
"' 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree).




United States sales would be included in the analysis. Assuming a
sufficiently high post-merger HHI and no significant complicating
factors that exclusively affect the foreign firms, a Departmental
challenge would likely result. Thus, even where a merger is be-
tween foreign entities, the analysis of the merger might involve
only traditional domestic concerns.
Where either the merging foreign firms or the United States
companies had substantial overseas sales, the circumstances might
call for the expansion of the relevant geographic market beyond
United States boundaries, the inclusion of foreign sales in comput-
ing market concentration, or the recognition of additional interna-
tional factors.
Even where only the exports of a United States firm into a for-
eign nation are affected by a merger involving foreign firms, the
1982 Guidelines would appear to apply. For example, assume that
West, Inc., a United States corporation, produces personal home
computers (the relevant product market) which are sold exclu-
sively in country A. Grande, S.A. and Compagnie Generale Blanc,
both foreign firms, also sell the relevant product exclusively in
country A. Grande and Blanc merge with anticipated deleterious
effects on West's export sales. Barring major comity considera-
tions, the effects test would seem to establish jurisdiction for a de-
partmental challenge under the 1982 Guidelines since the effect of
the merger was felt in the United States through West. Although
the relevant geographic market, country A, is totally outside the
boundaries of the United States, this would not pose significant
difficulty since the 1982 Guidelines recognizes the creation of geo-
graphic markets based on economic realities rather than on na-
tional boundaries. If there were appropriate HHI results, a chal-
lenge under the 1982 Guidelines could be issued even where the
merger of two foreign firms affected only the sales of a United
States company in a foreign country.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much of the domestic criticism expressed against the 1982
Guidelines is applicable in an international context as well. Com-
mentators have been critical of the large role played by economics
in the 1982 Guidelines. In fact, some have referred to the guide-
lines as the "Economists Relief Act of 1982," apparently only
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partly in jest.' 61 The graceful translation of economic theory into
the legal setting has traditionally proven to be extremely difficult
and presents numerous problems for lawyers, judges, and juries."6 2
Due to the technical nature of the 1982 Guidelines this is likely to
be a continuing problem, unless efforts are made to educate legal
practitioners and jurists more fully in the finer points of economic
theory. It has been suggested that the legal battleground has been
merely switched to the economic front, without a corresponding
improvement in predictability."'3
On the other hand, various aspects of the 1982 Guidelines
smooth the path of those entities considering mergers involving in-
ternational markets. The creation of "safe harbors", especially for
most vertical and conglomerate mergers, should lead to increased
predictability of challenge. The attention devoted to the inclusion
of international competition in market definition should lead to
the recognition of larger markets, thus reducing the level of con-
centration and making a challenge less likely.
However, problems peculiar to the international arena still exist.
While the 1982 Guidelines appears to be sensitive to problems
faced by foreign firms doing business in the United States and gen-
erally presents a liberal attitude toward international concerns,
steps have been taken to assure the reach of the Clayton Act over
foreign commerce. This conflict is not completely resolved by the
1982 Guidelines, which gives a general description of the con-
straints that will be recognized, but does not set forth specific
guidance or examples. The area of international mergers is suffi-
ciently complex to warrant guidelines specifically directed to
problems faced in foreign commerce. What is needed is a revamp-
ing of the Department's International Guide designed to reflect
the changes made by the 1982 Guidelines and to give those in-
volved in international business some badly needed clarification
and guidance.
Vincent Draa
"' See Antitrust Practioners React Favorably to New Merger Guidelines, 42 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1070, at 1315, 1317 (June 24, 1982).
"I See generally DeLong, The Role, if any, of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 298 (1981).
'" See Special Analysis, supra note 7, at 24.
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